Under Domestic Violence Act Can Divorced Wife Claim Right To Residence?


The Supreme Court in an ongoing judgment [Satish Chander Ahuja versus Sneha Ahuja] held that a woman can guarantee the privilege of the living arrangement in the houses claimed by family members also. This implies that she can look for living arrangement request concerning property which has a place with parents in law in the event that she and her husband lived there with some permanency after marriage.

What occurs after the divorce of a married couple? Could a woman record a domestic violence grievance after divorce? Would she be able to look for habitation request even after the marriage is disintegrated? These are a portion of the questions which have emerged after the Supreme Court conveyed this judgment.

According to the definition provision in the DV Act, “oppressed individual” signifies any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who asserts to have been exposed to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.

Further, “domestic relationship” is characterized to mean a connection between two people who live or have, anytime of time, lived respectively in a mutual family unit, when they are connected by affiliation, marriage, or through a relationship in the idea of marriage, selection or are relatives living respectively as a joint family;

“Mutual family unit” signifies a family unit where the individual abused day to day routines or at any stage has experienced in a domestic relationship either independently or alongside the respondent and incorporates such a family unit whether possessed or rented either together by the bothered individual and the respondent or claimed or rented by both of them in regard of which either the wronged individual or the respondent or both together or separately have any right, title, intrigue or value and incorporates such a family unit which may have a place with the joint group of which the respondent is a part, regardless of whether the respondent or the oppressed individual has any right, title or enthusiasm for the common family. This definition was deciphered in the Ahuja judgment by overruling prohibitive understanding in SR Batra versus Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169.

Section 19 presents a woman the option to live in a common family. “Notwithstanding anything contained in some other law until further notice in power, each woman in a domestic relationship will reserve the option to dwell in the mutual family unit, regardless of whether she has any right, title or helpful enthusiasm for the equivalent.” Section 12 empowers a distressed individual to introduce an application to the Magistrate looking for at least one reliefs under this Act. Section 19 enables the Magistrate may, on being fulfilled that domestic violence has occurred, pass a habitation request. Home requests can be any of the accompanying kind: (a) controlling the respondent from confiscating or in some other way upsetting the ownership of the bothered individual from the mutual family unit, regardless of whether the respondent has a legitimate or fair enthusiasm for the common family; (b) guiding the respondent to eliminate himself from the mutual family unit; (c) limiting the respondent or any of his family members from entering any segment of the mutual family unit in which the abused individual dwells; (d) limiting the respondent from estranging or discarding the common family or hampering the equivalent; (e) controlling the respondent from denying his privileges in the mutual family unit with the exception of with the leave of the Magistrate; or (f) guiding the respondent to make sure about a similar degree of substitute convenience for the wronged individual as delighted in by her in the mutual family unit or to pay lease for the equivalent, if the conditions so require.

There are disparate perspectives communicated by High Courts on the issue of whether a woman can record a protest under the Domestic Violence Act after divorce. The greater part of them allude to the accompanying two Supreme Court decisions in such manner.

Ensuing Divorce Will Not Deny Benefit To Which Aggrieved Person Is Entitled: SC In Juveria Case
In Juveria Abdul Majid Patni Vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori [2014(10) SCC 736], the Supreme Court was looking at the accuracy of a request for Sessions Court which excused an application recorded under the Domestic Violence Act as not viable. Inspecting the arrangements of the Act, the court held that an act of domestic violence once dedicated, the ensuing declaration of divorce won’t acquit the risk of the respondent from the offense submitted or to deny the advantage to which the wronged individual is entitled under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 including money related help under Section 20, Child Custody under Section 21, Compensation under Section 22 and interval or ex parte request under Section 23 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

In the above judgment, the Court had likewise seen its prior choice in Inderjit Singh Grewal versus the State of Punjab and another, (2011) 12 SCC 588. All things considered, the Supreme Court had held that ‘Application to Magistrate” under the Domestic Violence Act testing a ‘hoax’ divorce was not viable. The court had suppressed the grumbling recorded by the spouse.

Rajasthan High Court
In Sabana @ Chand Bai and Anr versus Mohd. Talib Ali [2013], the Rajasthan High Court thought about this issue. The Division Bench held that it “isn’t essential that the candidate woman ought to have a marriage or relationship in the idea of marriage existing and staying alive with the respondent as on the date of coming into power of the Act or at the hour of documenting of the application under Section 12 of the Act before the Magistrate for at least one reliefs as accommodated under the Act. At the end of the day, the abused individual, who had been in a domestic relationship with the respondent anytime of time even preceding coming into power of the Act and was exposed to domestic violence, is qualified for conjure the therapeutic measures accommodated under the Act.” The Special Leave Petition recorded against this judgment was excused in limine by the Supreme Court in 2018.